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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

9 March 1956

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: SNIE 100-2-56: ENEMY CAPABILITIES  
TO MISLEAD THE US

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the ability of US intelligence to cope with enemy attempts to mislead and misinform in a manner or on a scale which would threaten US national security.

SCOPE

This estimate, which differs radically from the normal national intelligence estimate, owes its origin to a recommendation made by the Killian Committee and NSC Action 1430. Specific recommendation C.4. of the Killian Report reads as follows:

"We need to examine intelligence data more broadly, or to invent some new technique, for the discovery of hoaxes. As a first step, we recommend a National

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Intelligence Estimate, with adequate safeguards, of our success in keeping secret our most useful techniques of intelligence. This estimate would suggest the extent to which an enemy might be manipulating the information obtained through these sources."

The terms of reference which follow are designed to reduce to practical limits the apparent intent of the Committee and to meet the essentials of its mandate, i.e., to estimate the ability of US intelligence to cope with enemy attempts to mislead and misinform in a manner or on a scale which would threaten US national security.

#### QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

##### PART I

##### I. METHODS BY WHICH US INTELLIGENCE LEARNS OF THE ENEMY

This section should describe the methods by which US intelligence learns of the enemy, as well as the kinds and amount of information received through each method.

- 2 -

TOP SECRET


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N. Other.

II. EXTENT OF ENEMY KNOWLEDGE OF US USE OF EACH METHOD

III. ABILITY OF THE ENEMY TO USE THESE METHODS FOR DECEPTION

This section should examine:

- A. The types and magnitudes of misleading or erroneous information which can be passed;
- B. Enemy motivations in passing such information;
- C. Known deception methods currently or formerly used by the enemy, including the withholding of information; and
- D. The difficulties or disadvantages which the enemy will encounter in passing misleading or erroneous information through each method.

- 4 -

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IV. METHODS USED BY THE US TO COPE WITH ENEMY DECEPTION

This section should examine the methods used by the US to identify and cope with enemy efforts to pass misleading or erroneous information through each method.

PART II

(to be done after receipt of contributions to Part I)

I. DEGREE OF US RELIANCE ON EACH INTELLIGENCE CHANNEL  
(Part I, Section I)

This section should examine how heavily the US relies on each particular method and on the information gathered thereby reported on in I above, with particular emphasis on the uniqueness of the information received by each method, i. e., which methods provide unique intelligence obtainable by no other means as against those which provide intelligence that can be corroborated by intelligence received from other means.

II. ESTIMATE OF THE AREAS IN WHICH THE ENEMY'S DECEPTION CAPABILITIES  
(by the use of one or several channels) SIGNIFICANTLY OR  
IMPORTANTLY AFFECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY

III. ESTIMATE OF US ABILITY TO COPE WITH ENEMY DECEPTION

